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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an agent-based model of peer 
review that looks at the effect of different editorial 
policies of referee selection. We tested four 
author/referee matching scenarios as follows: random 
selection of referees, selection of referees with a similar 
status to submission authors, selection of higher-skilled 
and lower skilled referees. We tested these scenarios 
against three types of referee behaviour, i.e., fair, 
unreliable and strategic and measured their implications 
for the quality and efficiency of the process. Results 
show that in case of randomness of referee judgment, 
any editorial policy is detrimental for peer review. If 
referees behave strategically, certain matching policies, 
such as selecting referees of good quality, might 
counteract possible bias. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Peer review is essential to guarantee the quality of 
scientific publications (e.g., Squazzoni 2010). Previous 
studies have tried to measure the effect of peer review 
on the quality of publications and referees’ reports as 
well as time and costs of different review processes 
(Jefferson et al. 2002). Other studies have examined the 
impact of peer review on authors’ satisfaction (Weber et 
al. 2002), the motivation of referees (Squazzoni et al. 
2013) and the editors’ approach (Neff and Olden 2006; 
Kravitz et al. 2010; Newton 2010). 
A recent large-scale international online survey 
(Mulligan et al. 2012) called for initiatives to increase 
the quality of of the process. It also indicated the 
importance of understanding the effect of referee 
behaviour under different author-referee matching 
circumstances, such as junior referees reviewing the 
submissions by senior authors or judgment bias on 
submissions by young and non prestigious scientists. An 
analysis on how papers are assigned to referees in a 
journal (Hamermesh 1994) suggested that except for a 
very few superstar authors, editors do not usually match 
authors with referees of similar quality. Another 
empirical analysis (Callaham and Tercier 2007) showed 
that academic rank, formal training or status as principal 
investigator could not help to predict higher-quality 
reviews. Some previous work tested a simple selection 
mechanism based on disagreement control that allows to 
reduce bias due to lower-skilled or unfair referees 
(Grimaldo et al. 2011; Grimaldo and Paolucci 2013). 
Unfortunately, there is no systematic study of the 
editor’s role in referee selection. This paper tries to fill 
this gap by simulating the effect of different kinds of 
author-referee assignments on the quality and efficiency 
of the process. On the one hand, our model explores 
different editorial policies to match referees and authors 
based on their academic status. On the other hand, it 
also considers different types of referee behaviour, 
which may be fair, strategic or random and looks at 
their implications in terms of productivity, efficiency 
and resource distribution. 
 
THE MODEL 
This section follows the ODD protocol for model 
documentation (Polhill et al. 2008; Grimm et al. 2010). 
 
Purpose 
Our model aims to explore the effects of different 
referee/author matching policies by journal editors. It 
also explores interaction effects between these policies 
and different behaviour of referees. It follows previous 
studies by Squazzoni and Gandelli (2012, 2013) and 
Cabotà et al. (2013). 
By referee behaviour, we mean the way scientists carry 
out their reviewing task, i.e. their reviewing effort and 
their possible intentionality. By analysing different 
editorial matching policies, we aim to explore possible 
options that editors might consider to improve the 
quality of the peer review process. 
 
Entities, state variables and scales 
The only agent entity in the model is the scientist. 
Scientists play one of two possible roles in each 
simulation step: author or referee. The task of an author 
is to submit an article with the goal of having it 
accepted for publication, whereas the task of a referee is 
to evaluate the quality of the submission she/he is 
matched to. Table 1 summarizes the attributes that 
parameterize the characteristics of scientists in the 
model. The editorial policy is modelled through a pair 
of state variables referring to the review and publication 
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processes that are represented by the parameters in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 1: Scientist Attributes 
 
Attr Name Brief description 
Id Identifier Unique agent identifier 
R Resources Amount of resources 
accumulated by scientists. They 
are a proxy of their academic 
status, position, experience and 
scientific achievement 
Rl Role Role played by agents: 
author/referee 
B Behaviour The scientist behaviour as 
referee: unreliable, fair or 
cheater 
 
Table 2: Editorial Policy Parameters 
 
Attr Name Brief description 
p Publication 
rate 
Percentage of submissions that 
are published. 
M Matching 
policy 
The way editors assign referees 
to authors: random, similar 
quality, higher-skilled or lower-
skilled. 
 
The model includes different spatial and temporal 
scales. The spatial scale indicates the number of 
scientists and the temporal scale the number of 
simulation steps. One simulation step represents one 
round in the peer review process, i.e. the submission of 
papers by authors, the review of all submissions and the 
selection of publications (see detail below). 
 
Process overview and scheduling 
Here, we describe the different processes carried out by 
the model in each simulation step, in which half of the 
scientists are randomly selected to play the role of 
author, while the others act as referees. 
 
Matching authors and referees 
Authors and referees are matched on a one to one basis. 
Therefore, multiple submissions and reviews are not 
possible and the reviewing effort is equally distributed 
among the population. We consider four different 
author/referee matching policies (M) as follows: 
random, peer, higher-skilled and lower-skilled referees. 
By matching policy we mean the way editors assign 
referees to authors (for details see the submodels 
section). 
 
Authors’ submissions 
The quality of an author’s submission (Q ϵ [0, 1]) is a 
random number from a normal distribution N(E,σa) with 
the tails cut off. The mean of this distribution, E ϵ [0, 1], 
is the expected quality of the scientist, which is 
dependent on agent resources as shown in Equation 1. 
The parameter v ϵ [0, 1] indicates the velocity at which 
the expected quality increases with the increase of the 
agent's resources. For instance, for a value of v = 0.1, 
each agent needs R = 10 to reach a medium-sized 
expected quality (E = 0.5). 
 
ܧ = ௩*ோ௩*ோାଵ        (1) 
The standard deviation of submission quality is 
calculated as a proportion of the expected quality using 
Equation 2, where the parameter av ϵ [0, 1] indicates the 
level of quality variability when preparing a submission. 
Indeed, while top scientists could write average or low 
quality submissions, an average scientist can also write 
good submissions. 
 
ߪ௔=E * ܽݒ        (2) 
 
Note that, by calculating σa as a proportion of the 
author's expected quality, the variability in the quality of 
submissions depends on the scientist's resources (e.g., it 
will be higher for well established scientists). Indeed, as 
senior researchers are usually involved in several 
research lines (that can be at different phases of 
development) and collaborate with heterogeneous 
groups (ranging from PhD students to other senior 
colleagues), it is reasonable to assume that they can 
produce submissions of different quality. 
 
Referee behaviour 
In the role of referees, scientists can be: 
• Unreliable, i.e., they do not take reviewing seriously 
(e.g. due to lack of time or interest) so that their 
evaluation does not reflect the actual quality of 
submissions under evaluation. 
• Fair, i.e., they consider reviewing seriously and 
provide an accurate evaluation, which is likely to 
approximate the actual value of the submission. 
• Cheaters, i.e., they consider reviewing seriously to 
outperform potential competitors by underrating 
their submissions, even at their own expenses (i.e. 
resources spent to justify their negative evaluation). 
 
Submission evaluation 
To evaluate a submission, referees first estimate the 
authors’ amount of resources. Although a referee can 
not know the actual amount of resources of an author 
(Ra), we assume that she/he can have a perception of 
this, which we called R’a. R’a is calculated as a sample 
value taken from the normal distribution N(Ra, σr). The 
mean of this distribution are the author’s actual 
resources, while the standard deviation is a proportion 
of this mean obtained following Equation 3, where the 
parameter rv ϵ [0, 1] indicates the level of variability 
when perceiving others’ resources. This variability 
mimics the typical knowledge and information 
asymmetry between authors and referees that 
characterize peer review. 
 
ߪ௥ = ܴ௔*ݎݒ        (3) 
  
The quality of the submission as judged by the referee, 
i.e., E’ ϵ [0, 1], depends on referee behaviour. 
Unreliable referees can fall into two types of errors:      
I) recommending submissions of low quality to be 
published or II) recommending against the publication 
of submissions which should have been published. We 
assume that unreliable referees have a fifty percent 
probability of falling into type I or type II error. If the 
referee falls into a type I error, E' is calculated as in 
Equation 4, with o ϵ ]1, 2] as the model’s overrating 
factor. The minimum value of o determines a certain 
degree of overestimation whereas the maximum would 
make the referee double estimate the author's resources. 
 
ܧ′ = ௩*ோ’ೌ*௢௩*ோ’ೌ*௢ାଵ        (4) 
When referees fall into a type II error, referees apply an 
underrating factor to the perceived author's resources as 
shown in Equation 5. The model parameter u ϵ [0,1[ 
indicates the percentage of underestimation made by the 
referee.  
 
ܧ′ = ௩*ோ’ೌ*௨௩*ோ’ೌ*௨ାଵ        (5) 
Fair referees evaluate authors' submission using 
Equation 6, so that evaluation scores approximate the 
actual paper quality. 
 
ܧ′ = ௩*ோ’ೌ௩*ோ’ೌାଵ        (6) 
Finally, referees behaving as cheaters always commit a 
type II error, as defined for unreliable referees (see 
Equation 5).  
 
Publication 
The publication rate (p) determines the percentage of 
acceptance so that only submissions getting the highest 
evaluations are eventually published. 
 
Resource expenses and accumulation 
When playing the role of an author, scientists invest all 
their resources for the submission. If the paper is not 
published, following the “winner takes all” rule 
characterising science, authors lose all invested 
resources. If published, authors accumulate resources 
according to their publication score, which leads to 
subsequent submissions of presumably higher quality. 
The guiding principle is that the more scientists publish, 
the more resources they have access to, and thus the 
higher their academic status and position is (e.g., 
Squazzoni and Gandelli 2012). 
We assume that a successful publication increments 
author resources through a linearly variable 
multiplication factor in the range [1, m], where m is a 
parameter of the model. We use higher values for less 
established authors (i.e. those with less amount of 
accumulated resources) and we approximate 1 for more 
established authors. This mimicks reality as publication 
is crucial in explaining differences in scientists’ 
performance but is more important for scientists at the 
initial stages of their academic careers and cannot 
infinitely increase for top scientists (e.g., Squazzoni and 
Gandelli 2012).  
When acting as referees, scientists allocate resources to 
reviewing as shown in Equation 7, where S ϵ R is the 
amount of resources that are consumed. The cost of 
reviewing grows linearly with the quality of author 
submissions and is proportionally dependent on the 
referee’s resources. If referees are matched with a 
submission of a quality close to a potential submission 
of their own, they allocate 50% of their available 
resources towards reviewing. Accordingly, they spend 
either less resources when matched with lower quality 
submissions or more resources when matched with 
higher quality submissions. Even though top scientists 
are generally expected to spend less time in reviewing, 
as they have more experience and are better suited to 
evaluate sound science than are average scientists, they 
lose more resources than average scientists because 
their time is more scarce and valuable (Squazzoni and 
Gandelli 2012). 
 
ܵ = ൬ଵଶ ܴ௥൫1 + ሺܳ − ܧ௥ሻ൯൰ *ݏ        (7) 
 
Unreliable referees spend less resources than fair and 
cheating referees as they do not put much effort in 
reviewing. As indicated by Equation 7, a multiplication 
factor s ϵ [0, 1] is applied to reviewing costs. This 
parameter indicates the percentage of resources saved 
by unreliable referees, while it is set to 1 in the other 
cases. 
 
Indexes calculation 
In order to measure the quality and efficiency of the 
peer review process, we define four indexes that are 
calculated at the end of each simulation step, namely: 
the evaluation bias, the productivity loss, the reviewing 
expenses and the Gini index (e.g., Squazzoni and 
Gandelli 2012). 
The evaluation bias (EB) indicates the quality of the 
peer review process by comparing the optimal situation, 
in which submissions would have been published 
according to their quality, to the actual situation in 
which publication depends on the referee opinion. As 
shown in Equation 8, we calcuate EB as the ratio 
between the publication errors (PE), i.e. the number of 
unpublished articles that should have been published 
and the total number of published articles (PA). 
 
ܧܤ = ௉ா௉஺ *100        (8) 
 
The productivity loss (PL) measures the percentage of 
resources wasted by unpublished authors who deserved 
to be published. Equation 9 calculates this metric as the 
percentage of the difference of the quality from the 
submissions that should have been published (BPQ, 
from Best Publications Quality) minus the quality from 
the submissions that were actually published (PQ, from 
  
Published Quality) with respect to the quality from 
submissions that should have been published (BPQ). 
 
ܲܮ = ஻௉ொି௉ொ஻௉ொ *100        (9) 
 
The reviewing expenses (REx) is the ratio between the 
total resources spent by referees and the total resources 
invested by authors. As indicated by Equation 10, they 
are measured as the sum of resources used by referees in 
the evaluation process (RevSp) divided by the sum of 
resources invested by authors in their submissions 
(AuthSp). 
 
ܴܧݔ = ோ௘௩ௌ௣஺௨௧௛ௌ௣ *100        (10) 
 
Finally, the Gini index measures the inequality in the 
allocation of resources at the system level; it takes 0 
when there is complete equality in the resource 
distribution and 1 when a single agent has everything. 
We calculate this index by considering the difference of 
resources for each pair of agents as in Equation 11, 
where n is the number of scientists and തܴ is the mean of 
the amount of resources of everyone. 
 
Gini = ∑ ∣∣ோ೔ିோೕ∣∣
೙೔,ೕసబ
ଶ∗ோത∗௡మ         (11) 
Submodels 
Depending on the type of author/referee matching 
policy and reviewing behaviour, we developed sixteen 
submodels that include certain typical situations of peer 
review. 
 
Matching policy scenarios 
We distinguish four types of author/referee matching 
policy (M)  scenarios as follows: random, peer, higher-
skilled and lower-skilled. 
In the “random” matching policy (RMP), authors and 
referees are randomly matched as if editors would lack 
knowledge of the scientists’ expertise. This mimics the 
“luck of the reviewer draw” situation where good 
quality authors can be matched to lower quality referees 
and vice-versa. In the other scenarios, we assume that 
editors have full information on the potential quality of 
their pool of referees that can be used for referee 
selection. 
In the “peer” matching policy (PMP), authors are 
matched to referees with similar skills. We arranged 
authors and referees in two lists that are sorted in 
descending order by the amount of resources. By 
following this ordering, authors are paired with their 
corresponding referees. 
In the “higher-skilled” matching policy (HSMP), 
authors are matched to referees of higher expertise. In 
this case, for each author, there are two lists of referees: 
one including referees with equal or greater amount of 
resources, the other one including referees with lower 
resources than the author. Then, the author is assigned a 
random referee from the first list unless there is no one 
left (i.e., all of them have been previously matched to 
other authors). In the latter case, a random referee from 
the second list is selected. 
Finally, in the “lower-skilled” matching policy (LSMP),  
authors are matched with referees of lower prestige. The 
logic is the same as in the “higher-skilled” matching 
policy. 
It is worth noting that the last two scenarios mimic 
situations in which editors could exploit the willingness 
of high quality scientists to contribute to the reviewing 
process (i.e. the “higher-skilled” matching policy) or 
where young scholars (typically PhD students and post-
doc researchers) are more frequently involved. It is also 
worth noting that, in the higher- and lower-skilled 
scenarios, the success in the application of the matching 
policy is influenced by the concrete availability of the 
required referees. For instance, matching an author to a 
referee with higher resources would not be possible in a 
situation in which good referees had been already 
assigned. To check for this, we measured how many 
times these situations occurred in our simulations. On 
average, these situations occurred for about 20% of the 
matchings. On the one hand, this would mimick a 
realistic constraint of peer review, as editors cannot 
always find an optimal matching. On the other hand, 
this constraint has a limited impact on our results. 
 
Reviewing behaviour scenarios 
We designed four scenarios for evaluating the effect of 
unreliable, fair and cheating behaviour of referees.  
In the “random behaviour” scenario, there is no room 
for cheating strategies but only for random behaviour. 
This is a baseline for studying the effect of the cheating 
behaviour. During the initialisation of this scenario, we 
set the scientists behaving unreliably by means of the 
model parameter up ϵ [0, 1], which indicates the 
probability of being unreliable. Then, referee behaviour 
does not change during the simulation, as if there were 
no learning or influence from the context. 
In the “cheating” scenario, we assume a fixed number of 
unreliable referees (determined by the up parameter) 
while the rest of  referees behave according to the 
following criterion: if referees perceive that authors they 
are matched to have similar or higher resources, they 
see them as competitors and behave as cheaters; 
otherwise, they behave fairly. To do so, referees 
estimate authors' resources (R'a) using a normal 
distribution of the form N(Ra, ߪ௥), where Ra is the actual 
author’s resources and ߪ௥ follows equation 3. 
In the “local competition” scenario, we assume a fixed 
number of unreliable referees (in accordance with the up 
parameter), while the rest of referees detect possible 
competitors only in their own resources neighbourhood. 
This scenario mimics a situation where referees 
underrate submissions by authors that have similar 
resources, while not caring about others. In these cases, 
their evalutation is fair. To this purpose, we use a 
Gaussian neighbourhood function of the form N(Rr, ߪ௖) 
from which we obtain a sample value ϒ. The mean of 
this normal distribution is the referee's amount of 
  
resources (Rr), while the standard deviation follows 
Equation 12 using the parameter cd ϵ [0, 1], which 
indicates the distance needed to consider an author as a 
competitor. Then, referees adopt cheating behaviour 
when the perceived author's resources (R'a ϵ N(Ra, ߪ௥)) 
are within the interval [Rr-(|Rr-ϒ|), Rr+(|Rr-ϒ|)]. 
Otherwise, referees behave fairly. 
 
ߪ௖ = ܴ௥*ܿ݀        (12) 
In the “glass ceiling” scenario, we assume that there is a 
fixed number of unreliable referees (again set through 
the up paremeter) while the rest of referees try to 
outperform both the less and the more productive 
colleagues. Therefore, given a referee's amount of 
resources (Rr), the probability of cheating increases 
when the perceived author's resources (R'a ϵ N(Ra, ߪ௥)) 
approach Rr and it is higher when they are greater than 
Rr. To model the probability of cheating 
(P(B=cheating)), we used the logistic function shown in 
Equation 13, where d indicates the absolute distance 
between the author’s and the referee’s resources (i.e. d = 
|R'a-Rr|). 
 
ܲሺܤ = ݄ܿ݁ܽݐ݅݊݃ሻ = ଵ൫௘షሺഁభ*೏శഁబሻାଵ൯        (13) 
Constants ߚ଴ and ߚଵ determine the shape of the curve as 
shown in Figure 1 and are calculated as in Equations 14 
and 15, respectively. These equations are related to the 
three model parameters as follows: k1 indicates the 
probability of cheating when both referee and author 
have the same amount of resources (i.e. d = 0), and k2 
indicates the probability of cheating when the distance 
between the author's and the referee's resources is equal 
to k3. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The logistic function used for detecting 
competitors in the “glass ceiling” scenario. 
 
ߚ଴ = −݈݊ ቀଵି௞భ௞భ ቁ        (14) 
ߚଵ =
௟௡ቀభషೖమೖమ ቁାఉబ
௞య         (15) 
 
 
Global parameters of the model 
Table 3 shows the model parameters also including the 
number of scientists (n) and the initial amount of 
resources for each of them (r0). It also specifies the 
range and values that we used to obtain the results 
shown in the next section. 
 
Table 3: Global parameters of the model 
 
Par. Description Range Values 
n Number of scientists Գ 200 
r0 Initial resources Թ 1  
f Fixed amount of 
resources gained per 
agent in each 
simulation step 
Թ 1 
p Publication rate [0, 1] {0.25, 
0.5,0.7
5} 
m Publication multiplier Թ 1.5 
up Probability of being 
unreliable 
[0, 1] 0.5 
s Reviewing expenses 
factor for unreliable 
referees 
[0, 1] 0.5 
o Overrating factor in 
type I errors 
]1, 2] 1.9 
u Underrating factor in 
type II errors 
[0, 1[ 0.1 
v Submission quality 
velocity 
[0, 1] 0.1 
av Author variability [0, 1] 0.1 
rv Reviewing variability [0, 1] 0.1 
cd Competitor distance in 
the local competition 
scenario 
[0, 1] 0.5 
k1 Cheating probability 
when resources are 
equal in the glass 
ceiling scenario 
[0, 1] {0.75,  
 0.85,  
 1} 
k2 Cheating probability 
when resources differ a 
value of k3 in the glass 
ceiling scenario 
[0, 1] {0.4,    
  0.5,  
  0.6} 
k3 Resource distance to 
have a k2 cheating 
probability in the glass 
ceiling scenario 
Թ {1, 
  2, 
  5,  
  10} 
 
RESULTS 
This section shows the results for all possible 
combinations of the matching policy and referee 
behaviour scenarios presented above. For each setting, 
we averaged the results for 10 runs of 200 simulation 
steps.  
Table 4 shows the results for the most competitive 
publication rate (p = 0.25) which means 25% of 
submissions eventually published in each simulation 
step. Other less competitive policies were tested (e.g., p 
  
= 0.50 and p = 0.75) that yielded similar results which, 
for the sake of shortness, we did not report here. 
In the case of “random” and “local competition” referee 
behaviour, any editorial matching policy determined 
more evaluation bias, higher productivity lost and 
similar or higher reviewing expenses than the random 
matching. The situation was different in the “cheating”  
and “glass ceiling” scenarios. In these cases, the “peer” 
and “higher-skilled” matching policies significantly 
lowered evaluation bias and the productivity loss 
compared to the “random” matching policy. In terms of 
resource distribution, “random behaviour” and “local 
competition” scenarios generally generated higher 
values for the Gini index, unless the “peer” matching 
policy was applied. 
 
Table 4: The effects of editorial matching policies on 
the peer review process. 
 
 
It is worth noting that the difference of the competitors’ 
detection mechanism had a considerable effect on the 
average percentage of cheaters in the population. 
Generally, this was higher in the “glass ceiling” 
scenario, although the highest value was reached when 
the “peer” matching policy was applied in the “local 
competition” scenario, i.e., when authors were matched 
with referees of similar quality. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that the evaluation bias is not univocally 
correlated with the number of cheaters in the 
population. This reflects the importance of the editorial 
matching policy to influence the peer review process. 
Figure 2 shows the indexes equilibrium for the “local 
competition” scenario. In this situation, applying a 
“peer” matching policy is detrimental as it leads to 
higher evaluation bias, productivity loss and  reviewing 
expenses. On the other hand, other editorial matching 
policies lead to better quality, productivity and 
efficiency of peer review. Though, this came at a price 
of having a more unequal distribution of resources, 
where it is assumed that the best published scientists get 
the most (e.g., Squazzoni and Gandelli 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2: Indexes equilibrium for the different editorial 
matching policies in a “local competition” behavioural 
scenario. Note that the Gini index in this figure has been 
drawn as a percentage. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aimed to contribute to a growing stream of 
literature that looks at peer review through agent-based 
models (e.g., Thurner and Hanel 2011; Allesina 2012; 
Paolucci and Grimaldo 2014). Given the lack of 
empirical data on internal processes of peer review, the 
use of agent-based models can allow us to understand 
implications of scientist behaviour in idealised 
situations (Squazzoni and Takacs 2011).  
Our results show possible editorial counteractions to 
reduce the impact of referee misbehaviour, such as 
matching authors and referees by looking at their 
reputation. We found that, in case of complete 
randomness of referee judgment, any editorial matching 
policy may have even a negative effect. If referees 
behave strategically, certain matching policies, such as 
assigning referees of similar or higher quality than 
submission authors, might counteract referee bias. 
Besides certain implementation constraints, e.g., the 
scarce availability of reliable referees, there is also a 
side-effect of exploiting reliable referees, i.e., 
generating benefits to published authors who might gain 
cumulative publication advantages. 
Furthermore, we found that peer review outcomes are 
significantly sensitive to differences in the way 
scientists identify their competitors. A “man is man’s 
wolf” competitive scenario increases the chances of 
0
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60Evaluation bias
Productivity
loss
Revision
expenses
Gini index
RMP PMP HSMP LSMP
 Eval. 
bias 
Prod. 
loss 
Rev. 
exp. 
Gini. 
index 
Cheat.
perc. 
Random behaviour 
RMP 29.42 15.00 29.42 0.47 NA 
PMP 39.55 19.56 34.43 0.37 NA 
HSMP 32.99 16.22 30.87 0.43 NA 
LSMP 29.51 15.71 29.47 0.46 NA 
Cheating 
RMP 70.86 34.72 35.24 0.28 0.27 
PMP 51.97 25.69 35.19 0.33 0.25 
HSMP 61.95 29.81 34.60 0.30 0.19 
LSMP 73.00 36.92 34.86 0.29 0.32 
Local competition 
RMP 31.04 15.63 30.13 0.45 0.20 
PMP 57.87 28.61 35.70 0.31 0.41 
HSMP 36.54 17.74 31.85 0.41 0.22 
LSMP 33.47 17.37 30.06 0.44 0.18 
Glass ceiling 
RMP 70.35 34.70 34.56 0.29 0.34 
PMP 58.02 28.56 35.64 0.32 0.38 
HSMP 65.88 32.26 35.23 0.30 0.37 
LSMP 68.21 34.47 34.29 0.29 0.36 
  
referee bias. Our results showed that certain 
mechanisms, such as the stratification of scientists in 
local competing groups and the presence of niches of 
competition, might reduce the negative effect of 
cheating and excessive competition. On the other hand, 
if the competition between scientists is stratified and 
refers to local groups, the potentially positive effect of 
editorial matching policies tends to decrease. 
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